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Introduction
The so-called cyberspace is the environment where all shades of infor-
mation, whether economic, social, political or military, whether classified or 
not, travels and connect themselves. Additionally, it is the space where agree-
ments, purchases and sales, legal or illegal activities and varied manipula-
tions of data or information are stablished.
In such a context, it is not possible to write about security and/or de-
fense without linking these subjects to the cybernetic space and its complexi-
ty: the crimes, thefts, domains, controls and the power relations developed in 
such space, in other words, without paying attention to the geopolitics of the 
cybernetic space.
Frequently, the South American regional environment is being ana-
lyzed from several angles and themes by researchers of many countries of the 
region, especially in the context of the regional forums, as the Organization 
of the American States, when talking about a broader regionalization, or, yet, 
in the scope of the Union of the South American Nations (UNASUR), from 
the perspective of the South America continent. Diverse themes such as hu-
man rights, regional cooperation, strengthening of democracy, indigenous 
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Association of International Relations, from 25th to 28th July, in Belo Horizonte, MG.
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peoples, sustainable development, peace promotion, among many others, are 
part of the research agenda. Regarding the cyberspace specifically, there were 
initiatives in the OAS more recently in the late 1990s, and, at the beginning 
of the current decade, there was a more specific debate in UNASUR.
At the OAS, the initial concern was to fight cybercrime and the actions 
of the organization were linked to the Ministries of Justice of member coun-
tries. Furthermore, in the 2000s, after the 9/11 terrorist attack, the concern 
was to create an Inter-American comprehensive cyber security strategy focus-
ing on crimes, attacks and terrorism.
In the sphere of UNASUR, the first movement in relation to cybernet-
ic space took place in 2012, at the time of the formulation of a work plan by 
the South American Defense Council (CSD), which supported the creation 
of a working group to deliberate on the possibility of establishing regional 
policies and mechanisms to fight cybernetic or defense-related cyber threats 
(UNASUL 2012).
Although these regional forums present proposals to develop policies 
and strategies related to cyber security and cyber defense, each member coun-
try establishes its policies independently. Occasionally the definition of the 
concepts of security and defense regarding the cyberspace is not even similar 
between countries, as well as their policies and responsible bodies.
For that matter, the present article proposes to analyze the political 
projects and the structures aiming the cyber security and cyber defense sub-
ject in the Southern American space, employing as a case study three South 
American countries with the greater density of internauts - Argentina, Brazil 
and Colombia –, placing these policies in the context of two regional forums: 
the Organization of the American States (OAS) and the Union of the South 
American Nations (UNASUR), and, from the analysis of such policies, verify 
if there is a similarity and interlocution between them or if they are discordant 
and if it is possible to consider that it is occurring a geopolitical configuration 
of the cyberspace in the region that influences the conformation of regional 
power.
In order to develop this research, we mapped the key policies of cy-
ber security and cyber defense from the data collected in primary sources, as 
laws, decrees, resolutions, declarations and minutes published in the regional 
forums and in the countries surveyed, as well as secondary sources through 
specialized bibliography.
We structured the present article in five parts. Initially, we will make 
a brief conceptual discussion on the geopolitics of cyberspace; subsequently, 
we will present some considerations on the cyberspace, security and defense; 
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next, we will show the initiatives regarding the cyberspace developed in the 
scope of the OAS and UNASUR; and the specificities of the cyberspace in 
the defense and security policies of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia. Finally, 
the article will pose some considerations on the geopolitics of the Southern 
American cyberspace, focusing on the positioning of such countries regard-
ing the institutional structures, spheres of activity and cooperation policies.
The Geopolitics of the Cyberspace
Before considering the potential geopolitics of cyberspace in South 
America, it is necessary to make clear the theoretical perspective that we are 
assuming, as well as the adjective proposition of the concept of geopolitics for 
cybernetic space. In this sense, the first question posed is about the legitimacy 
of the use of a field of knowledge oriented, a priori, to the territorial space to 
refer to the virtual space.
From the ontological perspective of the “geopolitical” neologism cre-
ated in 1899 by the State Theory professor at the University of Uppsala, Ru-
dolf Kjellén, it would not be possible to link geopolitics and cybernetic space 
considering that original meaning of the concept addressed the study of the 
influence of the soil (geographical situation, space occupied and territorial 
domain, consubstantiated in its resources to be explored) on the political phe-
nomena. In elaborating his theory, Kjellén conceived an essentially continen-
tal space, perhaps maritime, given his concern of the state territory being an 
organism connected to the soil and in constant struggle for more space.
However, when we study political phenomena, we necessarily analyze 
relations of power and, for that matter, the field of knowledge of geopolitics 
carries, in its essence, analysis of relations of power and space, that is to say, 
not only the state space, which is the founding statement of traditional geo-
politics, as it is enlightened by Heriberto Carou (2002, 206).  
Spatial reflection on power relations cannot be limited - as in the case of 
traditional geopolitics - to those between States; It would be forgot then the 
numerous movements that occur on the sidelines; it would operate in a reduc-
tionist way limiting “the political” to “the state”. Thus, although critical Ge-
opolitics e-emphasizes the microscale analysis (which deals with the entire 
planet), as was the case in the traditional framework, this cannot mean the 
abandonment of other scales, at the risk of falling into a determinism geo-
graphical4 (Carou 2002, 206, emphasis added, our translation).
4 La reflexión espacial sobre las relaciones de poder no se puede limitar ---como ocurría en la 
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For that matter, we consider that power relations perform in different 
scales and dimensions just as they are only understood in the spatial context, 
in other words, the power needs a space to exist, since it cannot operate or be 
exercised in the vacuum, considering also that the power is always relative. 
There is no power if there is no associated object, once it is always exercised 
in relation to something or someone.
If in Kjellén’s concept of geopolitics political relations and space were 
implied, these two dimensions, therefore, need to be taken into account in 
contemporary geopolitical analysis: politics (power) and (geographic) space 
where it is exercised. In this sense, which spaces can be considered? 
At the current scenario, new spaces present themselves as locus where 
power relations occur, as well as other actors, besides the State, participate 
in this game. In this way, the geopolitical analysis incorporates new spatial 
dimensions, other actors and diverse powers.
Thus, cybernetic space presents itself as another locus where power re-
lations (political) happen. Could we consider it as another geographical space? 
What categories and constitutive elements does this “virtual space” exhibit so 
that it can be considered a geographic space?
According to Walfredo Ferreira Neto (2014, 79 - 85), the control of 
the virtual space is exercised by the most capable actors, despite being seen 
as a global and common space; due to this fact it becomes territorialized. 
The author goes on to say: “In the globe’s cybernetic environment, States 
define their territories [...]. Immediate examples, but not the only ones, are 
the domains of the “.br”, “.us”, “.uk”, “.it”; …, which perfectly indicate their 
respective territories”. 
In the constitutive aspects of the cyberspace there are borders that, 
agreeing with Ferreira Neto (2014, 70), must be seen in the form of a point, 
which can be at the same time information in its “package”, or a “knot” of a 
highway, or, still, a strategic structure or critical infrastructure selected as a 
result of the resources available to the State.
If we accept the existence of a cyberspace geography, then, it is pos-
sible to address cyber-geopolitics, with specific characteristics in each place, 
according to the actors involved and the policies that focus on it, as well as 
conflicts, crimes, policies and strategies elaborated with the intention of man-
Geopolítica tradicional - a las existentes entre los Estados; olvidaría entonces los innumerables fIujos 
que ocurren al margen; operaría de forma reduccionista limitando «lo político» a «lo estatal». De este 
modo, aunque la Geopolítica crítica hace hincapié en la microescala de análisis (la que se ocupa 
del planeta entero), como era el caso en la tradicional, esto no puede significar el abandono de 
otras escalas, a riesgo de caer en un determinismo geográfico
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age, protect, expand and attack it, that is to say, policies and power relations 
in and for cyberspace.
Cyberspace, Security and Defense: Some considerations
Throughout history, we found numerous examples of civilizations 
that valued the discourse and its study, for example, when Rome was an em-
pire. The importance of this exercise was so significant for some civilizations 
that they have studied the discourse through oratory and rhetoric, as the Athe-
nians did. 
 Through these studies, one could read not only the content, but also 
the interests and intentions of its author. Although a policy is not a discourse, 
in analyzing it we can understand values  and interests of the agents of the 
political game (Serafim and Dias 2012). However, one may stress that we are 
addressing political analysis and not is evaluation.  
  Although both terms seem to be synonymous and both can be ap-
plied to policies, the focus and result generated are distinct (Serafim and Dias 
2012). An evaluation consists in observing the consequences that a particular 
policy causes, verifying its efficacy in front of a given problem. In the case of 
the present article, we do not intend to look the results of the cyber defense 
policies of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, yet, the interests, positions and 
interactions of such countries, in view of this, to analyze and not evaluate.  
That said, a policy analysis should address three levels:
Table 1 - Levels of Policy Analysis
Level of analysis Descrição
Institutional Examine the interactions within the institution(s) 
involved. This level looks at the decision-making 
process within an organization, as well as the 
relations it maintains.
Decision making process In this level the interests of the agents involved 
are studied, as well as their reaction towards 
internal and external stimuli.
State-Society Relation Considers States’ rules and institutions. Power 
relations within them and the interaction of the-
se structures with society. This level connects the 
other two levels, revealing the interests behind 
the policies employed.
Source: Dagnino (2002).
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Defense policies generally consider the international environment as 
a motivator; so, the policy analysis should include a level regarding the inter-
national context. This context should consider existing power relations, at the 
regional and global scopes, the country’s position on the international scene, 
especially on some issues, as well as existing conflicts, summarizing, a geopo-
litical analysis of the international situation. This level gains more emphasis 
within the issue of cyberspace that presents cross-border characteristics.
In order to apply the proposed analysis at the beginning of the topic, 
we must first distinguish cyber defense and cyber security. The separation 
of these concepts can guide the analysis of the adopted policy. However, it is 
worth noting that this is an analytical exercise at the ontological level, since in 
cyberspace the concepts interconnect (Portela 2015).
As Paulo Carvalho (2011) states, cyber defense can be described as the 
set of actions performed in cyberspace, aiming at the defense of systems and 
information. Through such perspective, cyber defense presents value in the 
integrity of the force, especially in the production of knowledge and intelli-
gence. It should be emphasized that this author includes not only defensive 
actions in cyber defense, but also exploratory and offensive actions.
In turn, cyber security is associated, by Oscar Medeiros Filho (2014), 
with the dimension of public security. For this author, cyber defense is con-
nected with the notion of war, while the cyber security one is related to an 
illegal sphere. Therefore, in his view, the conceptualization of cyber security 
and cyber defense is connected with the threat that is being fought.  
Moisés Naim (2006) addresses the question in a similar way when 
arguing about the limits of the concepts of traditional security and defense. 
About these concepts, Naim (2006) states that defense is related to war, de-
fense of national interests, guarantee of survival and sovereignty, while public 
security is related to issues of illicit. So to distinguish cyber security and cyber 
defense we need to identify what cybercrimes are.
These can be categorized in two groups: cybercrimes and cyber-attacks 
(Portela 2015). In agreement to McGuire and Dowling (2013), the categoriza-
tion of such concepts must be performed through the analogy and applica-
bility in the traditional environment. For example, an online extortion is a cy-
bercrime, while a data theft from a military base is considered a cyber-attack, 
since it is an act of espionage and warfare.
After presenting these conceptual distinctions, we can categorize the 
framework of cyber defense, in a general view, through a Cartesian plan in 
which the axis represent a gradual scale regarding the understanding of the 
distinction of the concepts of cyber defense and cyber security, while the other 
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presents the classification of the nature of the organization. In one extreme, 
we observe the structures that address the themes of cyber security and cyber 
defense with total separation and the other edge the structures that unite the 
themes, to the point of approaching them as synonyms. When we classify the 
institutions of South America in this plan, we find the following figure: 
Figure 1 - Extract of South America Cyber Defense Structures (2016)
Source: Authors elaboration, based on Argentina (2010), Justribó et al 
(2014), Mandarino Jr. and Canongia (2010), Brazil (2012; 2013; 2015), 
Conpes (2011), Chile (2010; 2014), Paraguay (2013; 2015), Ecuador 
(2008; 2014), Uruguay (2005; 2014), France (2013; 2015) and Ministére 
de la Défense (2014; 2014b), Ministerio de Defensa (2015), Télam (2015), 
Contardo (2015), Velázquez (2015), Bonilla (2013), Infodefensa (2015) e 
IITCUP (2016).
Bolivia and Peru were categorized as undefined once there is no for-
mal characterization, through documents and structures, that take into con-
sideration cyber defense or cyber security. Argentina, Brazil and Colombia 
are highlighted in the figure above since they are the objects of this research; 
they present similarities for treating the concepts of cyber security and cyber 
defense in a different way.
The greatest divergence that we can observe in this group concerns 
specific structures for the treatment of cybercrimes. Colombia has only mili-
tary structures, while Brazil and Argentina have hybrid foundation, with mil-
itary and civilian organizations, dealing with cyber defense and cyber security 
respectively. The distinction between Argentina and Brazil is in the interac-
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tion between the two scopes. Although Brazil has agencies that communicate 
between themselves, interaction is limited to mutual consultations.
Cyberspace within the regional forums
In the range of the American regional forums, we will present a brief 
overview of how the topic of cyberspace is treated in two of them: OAS and 
UNASUR. Although the proposal for the analysis is mainly the South Amer-
ica continent, it is important to situate the region in the context of a more 
hemispheric forum, in view of the double linkage of the South American 
countries with both organizations. 
Cyberspace and the OAS
Within the agenda of OAS, the first initiative to approach themes re-
lated to cyberspace was the creation of a Group of Experts on Cyber Crime, 
discussed in the forum called “Meetings of Ministers of Justice or Other Min-
isters or Attorneys General of the Americas (REMJA)”. 
 The goal of this group, comprised of government experts, was to per-
form diagnoses of illegal activities executed on computer networks, to identify 
national legislation, policies and practices relating to these activities and the 
national and international personalities experienced in the field, as well as 
to identify mechanisms for cooperation within the inter-American system to 
fight cybercrime (OEA / REMJA 1999)5.
 After the creation of REMJA’s in 1999 the meetings of the Group of 
Experts on Cyber Crime, were held regularly, ranging from two to three years. 
The ninth and most recent one took place in 2016. 
In order to facilitate and to make the cooperation and the exchange 
of information among the governmental cyber-experts of the OAS member 
5 “Because of the importance and difficulty of the issues presented by cyber crime, and the 
spread and potential magnitude of the problems it poses for our countries, it is recommended 
to establish an intergovernmental expert group, within the framework of the OAS, with a 
mandate to:
1 - complete a diagnosis of criminal activity which targets computers and information, or which 
uses computers as the means of committing an offense;
2 - complete a diagnosis of national legislation, policies and practices regarding such activity; 
3 - identify national and international entities with relevant expertise; and
4 - identify mechanisms of cooperation within the inter-American system to combat cyber 
crime” (OEA/ REMJA 1999, official translation)
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states more efficient, an online portal6 was created, in which the countries 
legislations on the subject, the recommendations from each Group of Experts 
meeting, and the proposition of a “24/7 High Technology Crime Contact Net-
work” are listed, with the purpose to share and denounce cybercrime in inter-
national cooperation, involving other countries outside the OAS, such as the 
United Nations, the European Union, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Forum, the OECD, the G-8, the Commonwealth and INTERPOL. However, 
even though the propositions in this respect go back to the recommenda-
tions resulting from the meeting of the year 2000, at the 2016 meeting, those 
countries that had not yet adhered to that network were still oriented to do so 
in the shortest possible time. 
The objectives of the Group of Experts on Cyber  Crime continue to be:
To strengthen the international cooperation in the investigation and pros-
ecution of cybercrime, facilitate the exchange of information and experi-
ences among its members and formulate the recommendations that are 
necessary to improve to improve and strengthen cooperation among the 
OAS member states and with other organizations or mechanisms. (OEA 
2017, our translation) 
However, in parallel with the existence of this Group, which focused 
only on cybercrime, in 2003 the AG/RES 1939 (XXXIII-O/03) “Development 
of an Inter-American Strategy to Fight Threats to Cybersecurity” was pub-
lished, this resolution was approved at the fourth plenary session, on June 10, 
2003.
In this resolution, it was recommended to the Permanent Council 
that a project on strategies of cybersecurity to the member States should be 
developed through the Committee on Hemispheric Security, in coordina-
tion and cooperation with the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism 
(CICTE), the Inter-American Telecommunications Commission (CITEL) and 
the Group of Experts on Cyber Crime of the Meetings of Ministers of Justice 
or Other Ministers or Attorneys General of the Americas (REMJA), or another 
body supported by the OAS. Therefore, a comprehensive strategy project was 
proposed, addressing the multidimensional and multidisciplinary aspects of 
cyber security (OEA 2003). 
In 2004, through the adoption of the AG/RES. 2004 (XXXIV-O/04) 
by the General Assembly, the “Comprehensive inter-American cybersecurity 
strategy: A multidimensional and multidisciplinary approach to creating a 
culture of cybersecurity” was implemented and requested that the member 
6 For more information on the online portal, check http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/
cybersp.htm.
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States of OAS implemented the guidelines contained in this document (OEA 
2004). 
Among these guidelines was the orientation for member countries 
to establish or to identify national “vigilance and alert” groups, the so-called 
Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRT). Also, the creation of 
an Inter-American Surveillance and Warning for the quick dissemination of 
information on cyber security and the response to crisis, incidents and threats 
to computer security, as well as seeking to promote the development of a cul-
ture that would allow the strengthening of cybersecurity in the Hemisphere. 
If on the one hand the creation of the Group of Experts on Cybercrime 
was conceived in the 1990s and focused on the creation of a network aimed 
at fighting cybercrime, on the other, the proposal to create a comprehensive 
cybersecurity strategy in 2003 was the result of the initiatives designed in a 
post-terrorist world of 9/11, in 2001. The concern in that moment was not 
only with crimes, but also with a strategy that involved cyber-terrorist threats, 
attacks on critical infrastructures7, among other issues. It should be noted 
that the creation of the Group of Experts on Cyber Crime in 1999 did not 
mention the term “critical infrastructure”. 
Both the creation of the Group of Experts on Crime in 1999 and of the 
Comprehensive inter-American Cybersecurity Strategy, approved in 2004, 
failed to guarantee the effective participation of all OAS member countries. 
The recommendations contained in the IX Meeting of the Group of Experts 
on Cyber Crime, the most recent, urged member countries to comply with 
guidelines established by the group, six of which had not been accomplished 
by states yet, for example, the creation of a network: “the States that have not 
yet done so, in the shortest possible time, consider the possibility of join-
ing the ‘24/7 High-Tech Crime Network’ of the G-7”. Regarding the Compre-
hensive Cybersecurity Strategy, from 34 (thirty four) member countries, only 
17 (seventeen), that is to say, half of them presented Computer Emergency 
Response Teams (CERT) or Computer Security Incident Response Teams 
(CSIRT), bodies that the own OAS suggested as necessary and promoted 
their creations in the member States. From the 17 (seventeen) countries that 
have CERT or CSIRT, 11 (eleven) of them are members of the UNASUR: Ar-
gentina, Colombia, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, 
Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela. The others are Canada, USA, Guatemala, 
Mexico, Panama, and Trinidad and Tobago.
7 We will develop a culture of cyber security in the Americas by adopting effective prevention 
measures to anticipate, address and respond to cyber attacks, regardless of their origin, by 
fighting cybernetic threats and cybercrime, typifying attacks against cyberspace, protecting 
critical infrastructure and securing the systems networks (OEA 2004, 129, our translation) 
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By analyzing the records and documents of the General Assembly of 
the OAS (qualified texts of Declarations and Resolutions), from the adoption 
of the comprehensive strategy in 2004, we could perceive that the issue  of 
cyber security appeared to be linked to terrorism (2005 and 2011), to tele-
communications (2006) and to strategies in the framework of the Caribbean 
Community/ CARICOM (2010, 2013, 2016). 
We can infer that after the US government’s spy scandal in Brazil, 
revealed in August 2013 by the former US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
technical advisor, Edward Snowden, a movement emerged in 2012, in the 
context of UNASUR, for the creation of a working group on the theme, with 
a focus on cyber defense, an initiative that occurs in parallel with those exist-
ing in the OAS, weaking initiatives that more directly involved Brazil in this 
regional body.
Cyberspace and the UNASUR
The first evidence of UNASUR’s concern with cyberspace issues was 
in 2012, when the South American Defense Council (CSD) formulated a 
work plan for that year. Among the points provided in the plan, UNASUR 
highlighted the need to create a working group to evaluate the possibility of 
establishing regional policies and mechanisms to fight cybernetic or informa-
tion-based threats in the area of  defense (UNASUR 2012). The leader of this 
group would be Peru.
In the following year, 2013, the work plan no longer required the as-
sessment of the possibility of establishing policy, but rather its effective es-
tablishment, as well as regional mechanisms to fight cyber threats in the area 
of  defense (Justribó 2014). It is noted, through these two documents, that 
UNASUR initiated its proposals of cyber defense distinguishing cybernetic 
threats of computer threats. Furthermore, these documents emphasize the 
fight of threats in the context of defense, that is, to distinguish this concept 
from that of cyber security.
That same year, the need for this organization to address cyber de-
fense increased in the face of a real threat faced by Brazil in discovering cy-
bernetic espionage by the United States, which was mentioned earlier. This 
event resulted in a special mention during the VII Ordinary Meeting of Heads 
of States in August, 2013.
The South American Defense Council (CSD) and COSIPLAN instruct to 
evaluate cooperation with other relevant ministerial councils and to develop 
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their respective projects on cyber defense and to improve the interconnec-
tion of our countries’ fiber-optic networks with the intention of making our 
telecommunications safer, strengthen the development of regional tech-
nologies and promote digital inclusion (UNASUL 2013, our translation)8.
Although there is no direct link with the Brazilian experience, the final 
declaration of this meeting reveals the urgency of promoting cooperation in 
cyberspace defense within UNASUR. In this case, the concern was not only 
the cooperation among the members of the organization, but it extended the 
proposition of collaboration to other regional organizations. It is possible to 
be seen that the securitization of the theme brought to the document of the 
VII meeting more concrete actions, such as the interconnection of fiber optic 
networks and the coordination of the CSD and the South American Infra-
structure and Planning Council (COSIPLAN) to endorse a joint infrastructure 
(UNASUL 2013).
The August meeting that happened in Suriname was the initial point 
for the work in relation to cyber defense to become more concrete. In the 
working plan of 2014 it was provided the Regional Seminar on Cyber-defense 
(Justribó 2014). In this event, the Working Group on Cyber defense of de CSD 
identified the four topics below: 
1. To create a regional forum of a Working Group on Cyber defense of 
the member States with the purpose of exchange knowledge, experience and 
solution procedures.
2. To establish a contact network of the competent authorities for the 
exchange of information and permanent collaboration
3. To define one platform and procedures of communication of the 
contact network
4. To deepen and systematize the thoughts of the conceptual defini-
tions of cyber defense and cybersecurity (UNASUL 2014, our translation)9
8 Instruye al Consejo de Defensa Suramericano (CDS) y al COSIPLAN, evaluar la cooperación 
con otros consejos ministeriales competentes y avanzar en sus respectivos proyectos sobre 
defensa cibernética y la interconexión de las redes de fibra óptica de nuestros países, con 
el objetivo de tornar nuestras telecomunicaciones más seguras. Promover el desarrollo de 
tecnologías regionales y la inclusión digital. (UNASUL 2013).
9 1. Crear un foro regional del Grupo de Trabajo de Ciberdefensa de los Estados Miembros, a fin 
de intercambiar conocimientos, experiencias y procedimientos de solución. 2. Establecer una 
red de contactos de autoridades competentes para el intercambio de información y colaboración 
de manera permanente. 3. Definir la plataforma y procedimientos de comunicaciones de la 
red de contactos. 4. Profundizar y sistematizar la reflexión sobre definiciones conceptuales de 
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 The result of this agenda was the creation of a network of contacts 
of the representatives of each country to deal with the matter, which would 
be communicated by electronic mail and telephony. The group also agreed 
on the need to create a coordination platform that would be called UNAC-
ERT. Lastly, it was required that all the countries share their nomenclatures, 
concepts and terminologies of cyber defense and cybersecurity for a debate, 
compilation and conceptual standardization.
Even today, these demands and the new requests are part of the agen-
da of the Working Group on Cyber  Defense of UNASUR. In the minutes of 
the I Virtual Meeting of the group of March 2017, the group listed six points 
of work that are still similar to the previous debates:  
- Situational diagnosis by country and/or region, which will establish the 
common starting point for the work of the group;
- Contribution on the concept of cyber defense and cybersecurity;
- Identification of institutions, terminologies and protocols that are used at 
the regional level;
- Diagnosis on the context of regional threats, actors and motivations;
- Definition of spaces for discussion and of proposals: forums, networks, 
platforms, observatories, etc.;
- Proposal for Regional Policies and Strategies for cyber defense, which 
will be presented to the CSD-UNASUR for consideration and which will 
be raised to the highest level of the regional organization. (UNASUL 2017, 
our translation).
We notice that the measures and the progress of 2013 and 2014 were 
consequences of the momentary increasing of debates on cyber defense, 
which despite the results produced, did not meet the agenda of the time. Ad-
ditionally, we note that the debate about the standardization of concepts and 
terms of cyber defense and cybersecurity is still an urgency to propose poli-
cies common to all members. Although we have not yet adequately addressed 
these issues, we note that UNASUR understands the two concepts distinctly, 
and also understands the need for standardization of cyber defense structures.
Cyberspace in the Defense and Security Policies of Argentina, 
Brazil and Colombia
There is no homogeneity in the South American cyberspace in terms 
ciberdefensa y ciberseguridad (UNASUL 2014).
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of institutional policies and structures, as well as in the approach to the con-
cept of cybersecurity and the perspectives with which they are addressed10. 
Sometimes both cyber security and cyber defense are considered by a military 
defense structure, or in specific cases, there is one civil and another military 
structure.
In the framework of OAS, the policies and guidelines are structured 
with focus on cyber security and include two mechanisms: one that address-
es the cybercrimes attached to the Department of Legal Cooperation of the 
Secretariat for Legal Affairs and the Meetings of Ministers of Justice or Other 
Ministers or Attorneys General of the Americas (REMJA) and another that ad-
dresses cyber security, the Integral Inter-American Strategy for fighting cyber 
security threats, attached to the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism 
(CICTE) and the Inter-American Telecommunications Commission (CITEL).
For that matter, the OAS focuses the cyberspace especially from a se-
curity perspective, and it seems to us that the organization’s central concern 
is to maintain a structure to face cybercrimes and illegal activities, within the 
settings of terrorism, and not to use the terminology “cyber defense”.
In the sphere of UNASUR, from what we have observed, the work 
focuses on cyber defense. The proposal, in 2012, to develop a Working Group 
had the intention to evaluate the possibility of establishing regional poli-
cies and mechanisms to combat cybernetic or defense-related information 
threats. Among the initiatives, a primary concern was the understanding and 
standardization of terminologies in the area of  security and cybersecurity. 
Likewise, the execution of situational diagnoses in the member countries to 
identify the structural and institutional peculiarities in the cybernetic area to, 
subsequently, develop proposals of regional policies and strategies of cyber 
defense and present to the SADC-UNASUR.
Although the actions in this institution are incipient regarding cyber-
space and are still at the level of diagnosis and standardization of terminol-
ogies, it is possible to affirm that the greater concern is the cyber defense, 
different from the initiatives within the scope of the OAS, which is focused 
on cyber security.
In relation to the three analyzed countries, Colombia addresses cyber-
10 Among the challenges which must be faced by the agenda of the South American Defense 
Council, in terms of cyber defense, are the different perceptions of the countries on the use 
of military and internal security resources. These conceptions on the use of the security and 
defense themes affect the different normative and doctrinal frameworks that rule the internal 
security and national defense systems among the member States of UNASUR, thus coherence 
in the confrontation of the questions regarding the cybersecurity and cyberdefense is difficult 
(Bustamante, Rivera and Cañas 2015, 112, our translation)
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security and cyber defense in one particular sphere: the defense one, which 
can generate conceptual incompatibility when integrating a joint political 
strategy with other countries in the region. We believe that this fact is linked 
to the historical need to face local armed groups, seeking their disarticulation, 
as well as fighting cybercrimes.
In the Argentinian case, cyber defense is under the responsibility of 
the military structure, which also supports cybersecurity and it is linked to 
civil bodies. 
In Brazil, the actions regarding cyber defense are under the responsi-
bility of the Cyber Defense Command (CDCyber), subordinated to the Minis-
try of Defense, while aspects related to government cyber security are inside 
the structure of the Staff of Institutional Security, an executive power body, in 
addition to the existence of several private entities responsible for cyber secu-
rity, through departments of information security or computing. These bodies 
cooperate with Brazilian cyber defense organizations.
Brazil and Argentina have similar agendas, essentially in terms of 
comprehensiveness, as their cyber defense agencies include several levels of 
strategic planning.
From the analysis performed, we do not notice among the three coun-
tries examined a power dispute or a cyber domain. Policies are more focused 
on internal issues and seek to meet the social, political and economic specific-
ities of each country. On the other hand, there is still no effective convergence 
between these policies, which weakens the cooperation with consequences 
for the strengthening of the cyber defense and cyber security in the South 
American region.
Although these countries are part of two regional forums (OAS and 
UNASUR), the policies and initiatives in these forums seem to follow parallel 
scripts, with different approaches and purposes, not a conformation or con-
vergence of guidelines and aspirations.
Regarding the cooperation between the analyzed countries, the ac-
tions are still in declaration stages and present as central characteristics the 
exchange of knowledge.
Argentina has shown its intention to cooperate in the cyber defense 
area in 2013. In Buenos Aires, during a meeting of the ministries of defense 
of Argentina and Brazil, Augustín Rossi and Celso Amorim endorsed a dec-
laration on defense cooperation between the two countries. The declaration 
aimed to echo the need for bilateral integration to promote regional integra-
tion as a consolidator of a zone of peace (Brasil 2013).
The cyber defense was also approached in the declaration, mainly in a 
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beginning of bilateral cooperation between these countries for this matter, as 
follows bellow:  
They agreed on the need to promote cooperation in cyber defense and the 
creation of a bilateral subgroup of work on the subject. They also agreed to 
organize this year a visit to Brazil by the cyber defense authorities of Ar-
gentina to learn about the Cyber  Defense Center of the Brazilian Army and 
they also welcomed the invitation that the Brazilian Minister of Defense 
made for Argentina to designate participants to the Cyber  War Course for 
Officers (2014) and for Sub-officers (2015), in Brazil (Brazil 2013a, 02)11
 The relation between Argentina and Brazil on cyber defense was ini-
tially designed as actions of mutual knowledge and confidence building be-
tween the two sides. They did not provide actions of joint institutions, but only 
visits and participation in courses. Therefore, we can state that the Buenos 
Aires Declaration on Defense of 2013 only allowed an approximation of the 
subject of cyber defense between the two countries.
This is evident when we observe the other actions provided by this 
declaration. The document can be divided into acknowledgments of ongoing 
or promoted works and predictions of future actions. In the other themes, 
the future actions required a deepening in the practical joint relationships 
that were already established, for example, the creation of Standards for Elab-
oration and Publication of Combined Doctrines between the two countries 
(Brasil 2013a). 
In the following year, Argentina also signed a declaration that involved 
the cyber defense theme with Chile. Different from the one endorsed with 
Brazil, this one established joint and practical actions, with the creation of a 
Bilateral Group to deepen cooperation in emergency military assistance (De-
fensa Sur 2014). In addition, the declaration required the creation of a bina-
tional force that could be activated in emergency situations.
It is worth noting that far from attempting to increase military capabil-
ities, Argentina uses defense agreements to get closer to other South Ameri-
can states. Bilateral dialogue, from this perspective, could serve as a basis for 
regional integration since it would promote peace in the region. However, 
11 Coincidieron en la necesidad de impulsar la cooperación en defensa cibernética y creación 
de un subgrupo de trabajo bilateral en el tema. Acordaron además organizar durante este año 
una visita a Brasil de autoridades argentinas en ciberdefensa con fines de conocer el Centro de 
Defensa Cibernética del Ejército Brasileño y celebraron la invitación que el Ministro de Defensa 
de Brasil realizó para que Argentina designe participantes es el Curso de Guerra Cibernética 
para Oficiales (2014) y pará  Suboficiales (2015), en Brasil (Brasil 2013a, 02).
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such declarations still do not present a practical application in the area of  cy-
ber defense besides the exchanges of information and interaction between the 
human resources of the countries involved.
However, this policy had been reoriented nowadays. With the depar-
ture of Cristina Kirchner from government and the beginning of Mauricio 
Macri term, cyber-defense cooperation efforts are directed toward the United 
States. This is what gives foundation for the idea that defense cooperation is 
used by Argentina as a tool of government and not as a State project.
In 2017, for example, during the visit of the Argentine president to 
the United States, these governments announced the creation of a Bilateral 
Intergovernmental Working Group on Cybernetic Policy (Argentina 2017). 
The group should identify cybernetic vulnerabilities of mutual interest to both 
countries, as well as the development of joint initiatives. It is important to 
note that the announcement does not only involve cyber defense, but also 
cyber security.
Another difference of this working group regarding the declarations 
made in the South America scope is that besides boosting this matter among 
the two countries, it also requires cooperation in international forums rel-
evant to the theme. This happens because these countries understand that 
space security depends on other international actors (Argentina 2017).
In the Brazilian case, cooperation in cyber defense presents the two di-
rections, intraregional and extra regional articulations. In both cases, we can 
deduce that Brazil presents the same model of cooperation established in the 
above-mentioned cooperation with Argentina. Consequently, the country tries 
to emphasize bilaterally the importance of this space, creating subgroups of 
work on the subject and establishing mechanisms for the exchange of knowl-
edge.
Added to Argentina, Brazil had already established these categories 
of cooperation with Chile, Germany and Mexico (Oliveira et al., 2017). In the 
case of Argentina, the subgroup of work has been meeting in order to deal 
with aspects of cyber defense (Brasil 2015a). Despite this, cooperation still 
persists in human resources, this time providing for internships in the area 
of  cyber defense (Brasil 2015a).
Brazil’s extra-regional cooperation in the area of  cyber defense has in-
creased with intraregional cooperation. In 2014, the country signed an agree-
ment with Sweden. On that occasion, these countries made a commitment to 
assemble working meetings to deal with defense issues. The second working 
meeting took place in the following year in Stockholm. Between the first and 
the second edition of the cooperation meetings, these countries made several 
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exchanges of experiences on the subject of cyber defense. In the last stage of 
this cooperation, a Swedish delegation visited the Center for Cyber  Defense of 
the Brazilian Army (CDCyber) (Soares 2016).
Still following the same path of knowledge exchange, Brazil signed 
an agreement with India in 2015. The plan to hold an international course of 
Strategic Studies in 2016 with the Army was foreseen: exchange of professors 
and researchers in cyber security and cyber defense and doctrinal courses in 
these two themes. More than a declaration of intentions, it is important to em-
phasize that the meeting with the Indians generated proposals agreed within 
the framework of the three singular forces, 
Another category of international cooperation of Brazil in which cyber 
defense has been targeted are those related to natural disasters. In 2013, for 
example, the country signed an agreement with Spain on this subject. The 
theme of natural disasters was highlighted by the Spanish side as a matter 
of approximation with South American nations, which was received by the 
Brazilian side as an issue to be dealt with bilaterally (Brasil 2013b).
At the same meeting, the Spanish Minister of Defense Morenés re-
vealed, likewise, the Spanish concern with matters inherent to cyber defense. 
The then Minister of Defense, Celso Amorim, described the Brazilian expe-
rience with CDCyber and proposed the exchange of information as the ini-
tial axis of cooperation (Brasil 2013b). Consequently, in general terms, Brazil 
works on cyber defense with other countries within the idea of  knowledge 
exchange, especially regarding the Brazilian experience with CDCyber. 
It is also important to mention the meeting between Brazil and Co-
lombia in 2012. At that time, the countries agreed to create a Joint Commis-
sion to review the capabilities of their forces (El Tiempo 2012). Composed of 
military personnel, it would also evaluate the cyber defense of both countries 
(El Tiempo 2012).
Colombia presents a different profile from Brazil and Argentina re-
garding cooperation in cyber defense. Colombian cooperation is mainly at the 
multilateral level, especially in the OAS forum. Within this organization, Co-
lombia received a mission that verified the situation of its cyberspace besides 
evaluating its capabilities in cyber defense (OEA 2014). 
In the bilateral axis, Colombia established a cooperation with South 
Korea, which began in 2014. Unlike other agreements and declarations al-
ready examined, the subject of this cooperation is Information and Commu-
nication Technologies (ICTs). Besides emphasizing cyber security and e-gov-
ernment, this agreement still requires technology transfer (Mintic 2015). It 
should be stressed that Colombia deals with cyber security and cyber defense 
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in the same military sphere, so cooperation in cyber security has a direct im-
pact on cyber defense.
Among the results of this cooperation is the Colombian electronic 
government portal, the electronic authentication system and the strengthen-
ing of technical capacities in response to cyber incidents and threats (Mintic 
2015). Additionally, it has also led to the creation of a data storage center for 
the Colombian government, an advanced cybersecurity response course and 
a study of the strategic and operational model of the country’s cyber security 
ecosystem (Mintic 2015).
In summary, agreements and declarations of cooperation in cyber de-
fense are still in the early stages. Cooperation is addressed in the context of 
the exchange of knowledge and exchange of cyber defense agents, with the 
exception of Colombia, which has an agreement with South Korea with spe-
cific actions. Therefore, cybernetics is considered within a broad spectrum of 
national defense and is still used as a tool for approximation or as a political 
instrument.
Final Remarks
Cyberspace, differently from the State’s one, exceeds borders and in-
volves a global network that is shared worldwide. For that matter, in agree-
ment with Madeiros Filho (2014), this environment demands new arrange-
ments of global governance, among them is the discussion of an international 
regime to the discussion of this matter. 
Although the cybernetic issue does not respect political borders, we 
noted that in the South American space it is still addressed primarily in the 
interior of the borders of the Nation States, as a domestic matter. 
Through the analysis of documents, we observed that efforts have 
been made by OAS and by the South American Defense Council (SADC), two 
regional forums that the countries that were analyzed participate, in order to 
establish policies regarding cyberspace.
Some initiatives, such as the Action Plans of 2012 and 2013 (UNA-
SUR), that proposed the creation of a Working Group to address the viability 
of establishing regional policies and mechanisms to fight cyber threats in the 
scope of defense, are examples; however, there is still no effectiveness in the 
policies promoted regarding the creation of regional convergence, although it 
has not been verified the rise of an old agenda in the power relations, having 
in the cyberspace the catalyst of possible obstacles that lead to litigation be-
tween States.
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The three countries analyzed have a tendency to prioritize the national 
focus on their documents and this preference for domestic treatment is justi-
fied as the country needs to initially guarantee its national sovereignty. While 
they do not finalize the organization of cyber defense and cyber security on 
the national sphere, the South American countries try to acknowledge some 
guidelines of regional forums and seek some level of approximation through 
bilateral cooperation between countries.
It is important to stress a positive aspect in the policies analyzed re-
garding the cybernetic matter: they are relatively recent and are in the process 
of implementation, as well as their respective structures, which facilitates the 
debate on the deepening of the conformation and cooperation between coun-
tries.
To come to the point, this article sought to present a brief outline of 
the defense and security policies addressed to cyberspace in three countries 
of South America: Argentina, Brazil and Colombia and to place them within 
the framework of two regional forums (OAS and UNASUR). However, we did 
not intend to exhaust the matter, given its complexity and the need for further 
study.
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The purpose of this article is to analyze the current cyber security and defense policies 
in Brazil, Argentina and Colombia, that have the higher density of internauts, placing 
these policies in the context of two regional forums: the Organization of American 
States (OAS) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), and the possible 
existence of an interdependence among them or if a new cyberspace geopolitics is 
being framed in the region, that influences the organization of regional power.
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